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White: White: Constitutionality of Drug Enforcement Checkpoints in Missouri

The Constitutionality of Drug
Enforcement Checkpoints in Missouri
State v. Damask'
I. INTRODUCTION

In the past several years, law enforcement officials have increasingly2
utilized checkpoint programs as a means of combating drug trafficking.
Because the United States Supreme Court has upheld suspicionless seizures only
for regulatory or safety purposes,3 lower state and federal courts have reached
inconsistent results in deciding whether roadblocks designed to detect or deter
criminal activity are constitutionally valid.4 In State v. Damask,the Missouri
Supreme Court became the first court to uphold the use of roadblocks designed
solely to intercept drug trafficking.5 This Note examines the problems resulting
from the court's further departure from the requirement that searches and
seizures be made with individualized suspicion.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
This case stems from the operation of separate highway checkpoints by the
Franklin County and Texas County sheriffs' departments.6 At these checkpoints,
police arrested defendants Richard Damask, Linda Alvarez and Maximo Garcia
for possession of drugs.7 On November 22, 1994, in an effort to discourage
illegal drug trafficking, the Franklin County Sheriff's Department set up a
checkpoint along 1-44.' The sheriff s department operated the checkpoint based
on guidelines prepared by a corporal from the sheriffs department. 9 The
department designed the guidelines to curb the officers' discretion in making the
initial stop."° The checkpoint was in operation from 4:00 a.m. until 12:00 p.m.
the following day." Although drivers approaching the area observed a large

1. 936 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1996).
2. See, e.g., Sherri Edwards & Rodger Birclfield, PoliceDogs Sniff OutDrugs at
Traffic Stops, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 23, 1995, at Al.
3. See infra note 42.
4. See infra notes 74-95.
5. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 567.
6. Id. The supreme court consolidated the two cases because they presented similar

legal issues. Id.
7. Id. at 565.
8. Id. at 568.
9. Id. The dissent pointed out that the department did not reduce the plan to

writing for approval by the sheriff until after the seizure occurred. Id. at 577.
10. Damask,S.W.2d at 568.
11. Id.
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sign that read "Drug Enforcement Checkpoint 1 Mile Ahead," the police located
the actual checkpoint at a remote exit approximately one quarter mile away from
the sign. 2
All travelers exiting 1-44 were met by a uniformed police officer as they
reached the stop sign at the top of the exit ramp. 3 The officer informed the
motorists that the sheriff's department was conducting a drug enforcement
checkpoint, checked for valid driver's licenses and registration and then asked
the drivers' reasons for exiting there.' 4 If the officer became reasonably
suspicious that the motorist was engaged in drug trafficking, he asked
permission to search the vehicle and its contents.' If the driver refused to
consent to a search, the officer used a police dog to conduct an olfactory
examination of the rear of the vehicle.' 6
At approximately 4:20 a.m., on November 22, Richard Damask was
stopped at the checkpoint and questioned by a uniformed officer. 17 Because
Damask appeared nervous, the officer asked permission to search the car.18
When Damask refused, another officer approached the rear of the car with a
drug-sniffing dog. 9 The dog alerted the officers to the trunk, where the officers
found a duffle bag containing packages of marijuana. 0 The officers then
arrested Damask.2'
The state charged Damask with a felony count of possession of marijuana
with the intent to distribute, deliver, or sell.22 Damask filed a motion to suppress
the evidence, and, after a preliminary hearing, the trial court sustained the
motion.' The state then brought an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of

12. Id. Because the exit offered no gas, food, or lodging services to travelers, there
would be little reason to leave the exit unless that traveler was a local resident. Id.
13. Id. Fully marked police vehicles were clearly visible to the motorists as they
approached the checkpoint. Id. The dissent noted that there was conflicting testimony
as to this fact. Id. at 577.
14. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 568.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that because a canine sniff indicates only
the presence or absence of contraband, the canine sniff is only minimally intrusive, and
is therefore not a "search" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. U.S. v Place, 462 U.S.
696 (1983).
20. Damask,936 S.W.2d at 568.
21. Id. The entire stop lasted approximately five minutes. Id. In all, sixty-six

vehicles passed through the checkpoint, and of these, ten vehicles were searched.
Damask was the only person arrested. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/14
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Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed, holding that the checkpoint operation
violated the Fourth Amendment. 24
Meanwhile, the Texas County sheriff's department conducted a checkpoint
on an exit ramp along U.S. 60 to U.S. 63 in Texas County.' Because this was
the first checkpoint operated by the sheriffs department, the department
consulted with, and relied, on procedures developed by the sheriff of a
neighboring county.26 Under the plan, a "Drug Checkpoint Ahead" sign was
placed 250 yards in front of the U.S. 63 exit ramp on U.S. 60. 27 Drivers who
wished to avoid the checkpoint could take this exit, whereupon they were met
by the actual checkpoint at the bottom of the exit ramp.2"
According to the plan, two officers were to approach the vehicle, explain
the purpose of e checkpoint, and briefly question the driver. 29 An officer was
to ask for the driver's license and registration only if, after observing the driver,
he became reasonably suspicious of criminal activity.30 If the officer developed
reasonable suspicion, he was to ask the driver whether he had any drugs in his
possession."
Linda Alvarez and Maximo Garcia arrived at the checkpoint during its
operation. 32 Alvarez appeared nervous in response to the questioning, and when
she could not produce a driver's license, the officer asked her to pull over to the
side of the road.33 Alvarez later consented to the officer's request to search the
vehicle, whereupon the officers discovered thirty-seven pounds of marijuana
hidden in the truck Alvarez was driving.3"

24. Id. at 568-69.
25. Id. The sheriffs department selected the checkpoint site from U.S. 60 to U.S.
63 based on information that it was an alternative route favored by drug traffickers trying
to avoid 1-44. Id.
26. Id. The Texas County sheriff approved the plans before implementation of the
checkpoint, and the neighboring sheriff was asked to observe and offer advice on the
operation of the checkpoint. Id.
27. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 568-69.
28. Id.
29. Id. All officers at the checkpoint wore uniforms, with the exception of an
officer dressed in camouflage. Id.
30. Id. The officers were instructed to allow any driver who refused to talk to them
to pass. Id.
31. Id. The officers questioned all motorists who exited, and the stops lasted
approximately sixty seconds. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. For example, Alvarez first stated that she was driving to Branson. Id.
When told she was going the wrong way, Garcia explained to the officer that they were
actually driving to Bertrand, Missouri, and that Alvarez was merely tired and confused.
The officers also became suspicious when they noticed a strong smell of deodorant or
perfume as they reached the vehicle. Id.
34. Id. at 570. The officers also discovered a loaded .380 caliber semiautomatic
pistol under the dashboard, which Alvarez claimed was hers. Id. at 570.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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Both Alvarez and Garcia were charged with felony possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute.35 The trial court sustained the
defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the checkpoint violated the Fourth
Amendment.36 The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, affirmed the
trial court's decision.37
The Missouri Supreme Court consolidated and reversed both cases. The
court analyzed the validity of the roadblocks by balancing the public interest in
38
preventing drug trafficking with the individual's Fourth Amendment rights.
Because the court determined that the checkpoints were operated in a
nondiscriminatory fashion as to the initial stops, and because the checkpoints
effectively advanced an important state interest with minimal intrusion to
motorists, the checkpoints were held constitutional.39
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Supreme Court RoadblockJurisprudence
Roadblocks are considered seizures within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.40 Because the Fourth Amendment proscribes only unreasonable
seizures, the Supreme Court traditionally has required the police have either
probable cause or individualized suspicion that the person seized is involved in
criminal activity.41 However, the Court has determined that certain types of
roadblocks and administrative searches42 do not require individualized

35. Damask, 926 S.W.2d at 570.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 567.
40. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976). The Fourth
Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
42. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (upholding administrative

searches conducted for the purpose of detecting housing violations). The Court
determined that in the administrative context, the government can conduct searches
without any individualized suspicion if the government's need to search outweighs the
level of intrusion upon the individual's privacy interest. Id. at 536-37. See also Frank
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (upholding administrative searches for the purpose of
detecting fire and health code violations).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/14
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suspicion.43 The Court has analyzed the constitutionality of these suspicionless
searches by balancing the individual's Fourth Amendment interest against the
legitimate interests of the government."
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,45 the Supreme Court upheld, for the

first time, suspicionless seizures of motorists stopped at checkpoints. In this
case, the United States Border Patrol set up permanent checkpoints to detect the
illegal entry of immigrants into the country.46 The Court first found that
preventing the importation of illegal aliens was an important governmental
interest. 47 Next, the Court determined that requiring individualized suspicion
would be impractical given the heavy flow of traffic at the United States and
Mexican border.48 Finally, the Court concluded that the intrusion on the
individual's privacy was minimal based on the following factors: the checkpoint
operation did not take the motorist by surprise, it involved less discretion than
other types of stops, and the location of the checkpoint was determined by
"officials responsible for [deciding] ...the most efficient allocation of limited
enforcement resources. ,, 49
The Court has, on the other hand, taken a different approach towards the
use of random, roving spot checks by police officers. In Delawarev. Prouse,50
the Court held that absent articulable and reasonable suspicion, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits an officer from stopping a motorist to check his driver's
license and registration.5 1 Because such stops were more likely to frighten
motorists, the Court felt that in such instances the privacy interest of the motorist
outweighed the government's interest in promoting traffic safety. 2 In particular,
the Court was concerned that such stops involved the "unbridled discretion of
law enforcement officials. '53 The Court also suggested that police officers must

43. See David A. Thatcher, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Sobering
New Developmentfor FourthAmendment Rights, 20 CAP. U.L. Rv. 279,281 (1991).

44. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979).
45. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).

46. Id. at 546.
47. Id. at 561.
48. Id. at 557.
49. Id. at 559. For example, the Court pointed out that the checkpoint was
announced one mile ahead by a large sign with flashing yellow lights, followed by other
signs as the motorist approached. Id. at 546. In addition, the Border Patrol agents wore
full uniforms, a permanent building was located at the sight, and flood lights were used

at night. Id.
50. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
51. Id. at 663.
52. Id. at 656-57.

53. Id. at 659. The Court felt the nature of these stops involved the "kind of
standardless and unconstrained discretion [which] is the evil the Court has discerned

when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion be circumscribed at least to some
extent." Id. at 661.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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have individualized suspicion before seizing someone for general law
enforcement purposes.' In this respect, the governmental interest in automobile
thefts "is not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control.""5
However, in important dictum, the Court suggested that states were not
precluded from developing methods for spot checks that "involve less intrusion
or that do not involve the unrestrained exercise of discretion,"
such as
6
roadblocks in which police question all oncoming traffic.1
Following Prouse, the Court did not address under what circumstances
roadblocks would be deemed constitutional until 1990, when it decided
Michigan Departmentof State Police v. Sitz. 7 In this case, the Court upheld a
sobriety checkpoint operated by the Michigan state police. In analyzing the
constitutionality of the checkpoint, the Court relied on the balancing test
developed in Brown v. Texas."8 The Brown test requires courts to weigh the
gravity of the public interest, the degree to which the seizure advances that
interest, and the severity of interference with the individual's liberty. 9 The
Court had little difficulty determining that the gravity of the state's drunk
driving problem satisfied the first prong.6' In turning to the "effectiveness"
prong of the Brown test, the Court deferred to the expertise of "politically
accountab[le] [law enforcement] officials. '6' The court stated that it is not the
Court's task to determine "which among reasonable alternative law enforcement62
techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger."
Therefore, although the checkpoints led to the arrest of only one percent of all
motorists stopped, the majority of the Court found this to be sufficient evidence63
that the checkpoint advanced the public's interest in combating drunk driving.
Finally, the Court divided the "severity of interference" prong into the
categories of objective and subjective intrusion. With respect to objective
intrusion (measured by the duration of the seizure and the intensity of
subsequent investigations), the Court found no difference in the level of

54. Id.
55. Id. See also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1926) ("It would

be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every
automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using
the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.").
56. Prouse,440 U.S. at 653-54.
57. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).

58. 443 U.S. 47, 48-49, 52 (1979). In Brown, decided around the same time as
Prouse,the Court held that the individual's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
officers stopped him in a known drug area and asked what he was doing, without any
reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 48-49.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 50-51.
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451.
Id. at 453.
Id.
Id. at 455.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/14
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intrusion between the sobriety checkpoints and the checkpoints used to detect
illegal aliens." The level of subjective intrusion (measured by the fear and
surprise experienced by law-abiding motorists) also was minimal." Because the
motorist "could see other vehicles are being stopped, [and] can see visible signs
of the officer's authority," it is less likely the motorist would be frightened by
the intrusion.' The Court also emphasized the necessity of carrying out such
stops "pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct
of officers."'6
In dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the majority for ignoring the obvious
differences between a fixed border checkpoint and a temporary, nighttime
sobriety checkpoint." The Court inMartinez-Fuertedid not require reasonable
suspicion only because it would be "impractical" to detect illegal aliens in a
moving car.69 Justice Brennan argued that states should be required to prove it
would be too difficult to detect drunken drivers in the absence of suspicionless
seizures."
Justice Stevens also refused to adopt the majority's deferential attitude
towards law enforcement officials.71 In addition to the element of surprise
necessary to the success of a sobriety checkpoint,72 he also was concerned with
the level of discretion the officers were given when questioning motorists,
choosing the site location, and determining the time of the checkpoint
operations. 73 Finally, he criticized the majority's willingness to defer to the
expertise of government officials, arguing the state should be required to
produce evidence comparing the sobriety checkpoints to alternative law
enforcement methods.7 4

64. Id. at 451-52.
65. Id. at 452-53.
66. Id. at 453.
67. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). In this case, the test was satisfied
because the checkpoint was established according to guidelines developed by an advisory
committee on site selection, guidelines designed to leave very little discretion to the
officers.

68.
69.
70.
71.

Sitz, 496 U.S. at 458.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 461-62.
72. Id. at 463.
73. Id. at 464. Justice Stevens felt that "unannounced investigatory seizures are,

particularly when they take place at night, the hallmark of regimes far different from ours;
the surprise intrusion upon individual liberty is not minimal." Id. at 468-69.
74. Id. at 462.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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B. Lower Courts' Jurisprudencefor CheckpointPrograms
Designedto Prevent Drug Trafficking
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of drug
checkpoints, lower federal courts and state courts have struggled in applying the
Brown balancing test to checkpoints of this type. For example, in Galberthv.
UnitedStates,75 the court struck down a police roadblock established to disrupt
the drug market in a high-crime neighborhood.76 "It is clear," declared the court,
that "police may not use a roadblock in order to seek evidence of drug-related
crimes."7 7 Pointing out that the Supreme Court had approved the use of
roadblocks in only two sharply limited instances, the court relied on language
in Prousethat suggested police must have individualized suspicion in all matters
relating to "the general interest in crime control. ' 79 The court reasoned that
suspicionless roadblock seizures had been upheld by the Supreme Court only in
those cases where the roadblock was targeted to "problems predictably
associated with persons who are stopped at a roadblock."8 ° The court also
questioned whether the roadblock effectively advanced the government's interest
in deterring drug trafficking. The government failed to rebut the "common sense
notion" that "highly visible patrols" present at the roadblock accounted for the
success of the roadblock, and thus any law enforcement technique involving a
"substantial police presence" would have had a similar effect.8' The court
concluded that the government's general deterrence interest did not outweigh the
individual's liberty interests.8 2 Thus, the Galberthcourt stated that the principal

75. 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. 1991).
76. Id. at 997.
77. Id. at 998. The court stated that for multi-purpose checkpoints, the police may
"constitutionally benefit from the 'spin-off' effect of an otherwise constitutional law
enforcement program." Id. at 997.
78. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, .496 U.S. 444 (1990)
(upholding constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints); U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte 428 U.S.
543 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of permanent immigration checkpoints). See
also supranotes 45-49 and 56-72.
79. Galberth, 590 A.2d at 997 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18
(1979)). See also 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE; A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) ("[A] general roadblock.., established on
the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime" would "quite clearly"
be unconstitutional.). See also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Cal. 1987);
Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
80. Galberth,590 A.2d at 998-99. For example, the court noted that in MartinezFuerte, border checkpoints could reasonably expect to uncover illegal aliens, and
furthermore, it was the only effective way to control the influx of illegal aliens. Id.
Similarly, in Sitz, an advisory committee designed the sobriety checkpoints specifically
to prevent and apprehend drunk drivers. Id.

81. Id. at 999.
82. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/14
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purpose of the roadblock could not be a subterfuge for detecting crimes
unrelated to that purpose. 3
However, some courts allow states to conduct "mixed-motive" roadblocks
as long as one purpose presented could validly justify the roadblock, even if the
state's principal purpose is to locate drugs.84 In Merrett v. Moore, for example,
law enforcement officials set up temporary, unannounced roadblocks on the
pretext of ensuring compliance with traffic-related laws, but the roadblocks were
actually designed to detect drug trafficking. 85 In adopting an objective test,
which requires only one lawful purpose, the court distinguished roadblocks from
the roving traffic patrols at issue in Prouse.86 Because roadblocks are designed
to limit the individual discretion of officers in the field, and no selective
targeting occurs, pretextual analysis is not appropriate. 7 The court then
examined the reasonableness of the roadblock seizures by focusing exclusively
on the legitimate purpose of the roadblock; that is, on the public's interest in
ensuring compliance with license and registration laws, and on the roadblock's
effectiveness in advancing that interest.88 In upholding the roadblock, the court
found that the state's interest in enforcing these laws outweighed the individual's
liberty interests.8 9
In State v. Everson" on the other hand, the court emphasized the
similarities between drunk driving and drug trafficking in upholding the
constitutionality of the roadblock. In this case, police set up a multi-purpose
checkpoint on a major interstate highway to coincide with a motorcycle rally. 9'

83. Id. at 997 (citing United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306, 1312 (D.C. Cir.
1989)). See Thomas Dilenge, FourthAmendment Law After Michigan Department of
State v. Sitz: Removing JudicialRoadblocks to DiscretionlessSeizures, 9 J.L. & POL. 561,

582-83 (1993). The author suggests this is an unsatisfactory test, because courts faced
with identical facts can reach opposite results, depending on what each court determines
the principal purpose of the test to be. Id. This is in fact what occurred in Galberth and
MacFayden. See also United States v. Morales-Zamora, 974 F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1992).
84. Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1550-51 (1lth Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 77

F.3d 1304 (1lth Cir. 1996).
85. Id. at 1549. The Eleventh Circuit was the first federal circuit court to legalize
roadblocks designed to intercept illegal drugs. Merrett v. Moore, 77 F.3d 1304 (1 th Cir.
1996).
86. Merrett,58 F.3d at 1550-51. The court stated, "No question is presented about

whether a state can lawfully conduct a roadblock solely to intercept illegal drugs; and we
leave that question open." Id. at 1551 n.3.
87. Id. at 1551 n.2.
88. Id. at 1551.
89. Id. at 1553. Because the duration of the stop is an important factor
in determining the reasonableness of the seizure, the court conceded that in the case of
one motorist, who was not permitted to turn around hnd therefore had to wait twenty
minutes, the level of intrusion was unreasonable. Id.
90. 474 N.W.2d 695 (N.D. 1991).
91. Id. at 696. The checkpoint was located in a small valley so that it could not
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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During the operation of the checkpoint, a "point man" determined which
vehicles to send to a search area for further investigation.92 Officers also relied
on a drug courier profile to help judge whether motorists were likely drug
traffickers. 93 The court concluded the intrusion was minimal.94 In upholding the
roadblock, the court stated that "the purpose of apprehending drug traffickers [is]
a societal harm at least equal in magnitude to drunk driving."95 Furthermore, the
true purpose of the roadblock is not entitled to significant weight because the
"subjective reaction of the drivers would not have been substantially different,"
whether the primary purpose was to check for license violations or drunk
drivers.96

C. MissouriRoadblock Jurisprudence
Prior to the case at issue, Missouri courts relied on State v. Welch, 97 a preSitz case issued by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, to analyze
the constitutionality of a checkpoint operation. This case involved a sobriety
checkpoint established by the Missouri Highway Patrol. The court prefaced its
analysis by declining to extend the scope of protection of the state constitution
beyond that of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.99

seen from a long distance. Id. However, the operation was conducted in the daytime, all
vehicles were stopped, and law enforcement officials were visible to vehicles as they
approached. Id. The inspections were conducted pursuant to written guidelines
developed by the North Dakota Highway Patrol Policy Patrol Manual. Id. at 701.
92. Id. at 697. The use of a point man (who was in fact a criminal investigator
rather than a police officer) in this case has been criticized on the grounds that it violated
the Sitz admonition against "standardless and unconstrained discretion ...
of the official
in the field." See Chris Braeske, The Drug War Comes to a Highway Near You: Police
Power to Effectuate Highway "Narcotics Checkpoints" Under the Federal and State
Constitutions, 11 LAw & INEQ. 449, 459 (1993).
93. Everson, 474 N.W.2d at 697. For a criticism of the use of drug courier profiles
in this and other cases because the use of profiles allows officers "to validate the
investigation of any vehicle or individual which the officer wishes to investigate," see
Braeske, supra note 92, at 459-60. For example, as to the profile used by the highway
patrol, an officer can justify investigating a vehicle based on whether the vehicle has
luggage on the back seat or no luggage in the vehicle. Id.
94. Everson, 474 N.W.2d at 702.
95. Id. at 701.
96. Id. (quoting People v. Bartley, 486 N.E.2d 880, 888-89 (N.D. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986).
97. 755 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
98. See supra notes 57-74.
99. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 631. The court relied on the Missouri Supreme Court's
analysis of Article 1, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution, which is identical to the
Fourth Amendment, and which the court interpreted to "provide essentially the same
protection found in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/14
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Therefore, the court
rejected appellant's argument that roadblocks were per se
unconstitutional." °
The court applied the traditional balancing test to determine if, in
conducting the roadblock, the intrusion upon individual rights outweighed the
legitimate interests of the state.'"' The court had little difficulty deciding that the
state has a legitimate interest in removing drunk drivers from the roadways."°
The court then relied on a number of factors in approving the level of intrusion
on the motorists.013 First, the roadblock was operated according to a plan
"developed in advance with field personnel and supervisory personnel.'
Second, the plan sharply limited the amount of discretion given to the field
officers.0" Third, motorists were given notice that they were approaching a
roadblock.' 6 Fourth, the roadblock operation utilized procedures designed to
minimize the delay to motorists. 0 7 Given the dangers of even one impaired
driver, the court also discounted the low number of intoxicated motorists
actually intercepted.10 8 Because the state has a legitimate interest in combating
drunk driving, and the intrusion upon the individual rights of motorists was
minimal, the court concluded the roadblock was constitutional." 9
In State v. Canton,"° the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District,
relying on the analytical framework set forth in Welch, held that the roadblock
at issue was unconstitutional."' The purpose of the roadblock was to check for

(quoting State v. Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d 420,425 (Mo. 1985)).
100. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 632.
101. Id. at 633.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court examined factors used by other states in determining whether
the particular roadblock met the balancing test. Id. at 627. The court also relied on
Prouse and Martinez-Fuertein applying the balancing test. Id. at 626-27.
104. Id. at 632.

105. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 632. The operation was conducted pursuant to specific
guidelines setting forth the locations and times to be followed by field personnel. Id. The
particular location was chosen by the staff of the general headquarters based on data of
alcohol related accidents in the area. Furthermore, the roadblock was authorized by the
commanding officer of the troop. Id.
106. Id. For example, officers posted a large sign notifying approaching motorists
of the roadblock, flares were placed along the road to guide motorists, police vehicles
were stationed with lights flashing, and officers wore reflective clothing. Id.
107. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 632. Most of the motorists were detained no longer
than sixty seconds, and vehicles were waved through if congestion occurred. Id.
108. Id. The court's analysis that there is "no necessity of numbers to establish the

constitutional validity ofroadblocks," foreshadowed the reasoning of the Supreme Court
in Sitz two years later.
109. Id.
110. 775 S.W.2d 352 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
111. Id. at 354.
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vehicle defects, driver's licenses, intoxicated drivers, and drugs." 2 Although the
court noted that apart from sobriety checks, no court had approved roadblocks
for these other purposes, the court concentrated primarily on the level of
intrusion and the lack of planning by the law enforcement officials." 3 In
particular, the court noted that because the roadblock was situated in a rural
area, without adequate lighting, flares, or other warnings, approaching motorists
would not know why they were being stopped." 4 The roadblock also was
conducted "without the approval of the chief of police of this small police
force.""' 5 Finally, the officers did not rely on any specific data when
determining the location of the roadblock." 6 The court concluded that it was
"not prepared
to relax the standards established" in past Missouri cases in this
117
area.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
In State v. Damask,the Missouri Supreme Court began its discussion by
stating that the checkpoint at issue -was a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment."' The court then set forth the relevant law governing the Fourth
Amendment as it relates to seizures."9 Because the Fourth Amendment protects
only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures, the court framed the question
in terms of whether the initial stop at the checkpoint was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. 2 0

112. Id. at 353.
113. Id.
114. Canton, 775 S.W.2d at 354.
115. Id. The court stated, "this is not to say that every checkpoint must have the
approval of the highest ranking officer in the department, but there should be evidence
that such authority has been vested or delegated to the officer who establishes the location

and procedure at the roadblock." Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. See, e.g., State v. Payne, 759 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); State v.
Vanacker, 759 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
118. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1996). The court distinguished the
initial stop from any subsequent detentions and searches, pointing out that only the initial
stop was at issue in this case. Id. The Fourth Amendment requires that any subsequent
detentions and searches be based upon "reasonable individualized suspicion." Id.
119. Id. at 571. The court noted that both the Fourth Amendment and Article I,
section 15 of the Missouri Constitution provide the same guarantees against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and its analysis will therefore apply to both laws. Id. at 570.
120. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 570.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/14
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The court stated that to meet this reasonableness requirement, seizures
generally must be based upon individualized suspicion.' However, the court
noted that under certain conditions, law enforcement officials may stop motorists
on public highways even when individualized suspicion is lacking.'22 In such
cases, the deciding court must determine the reasonableness of the seizure by
balancing the public interest in preventing criminal activity with the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests." The majority relied on the balancing test
derived from Brown v. Texas,124 which focuses on three factors: (1) the gravity
of the public concerns served by the seizure, (2) the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and (3) the severity of the interference with
individual liberty."z The court stated that the Fourth Amendment also requires
that in the absence of individualized suspicion, seizures must be made pursuant
to a plan that provides
"explicit, neutral limitations" on the conduct of the
26
individual officers.
In applying the Brown test, the court first considered the gravity of the
public interest.'27 The court decided with little analysis that the state's interest
in preventing drug trafficking was a legitimate governmental interest.'2 8 Next,
the court examined the degree to which the checkpoint advanced this
governmental interest."' The court noted that the Supreme Court in Sitz did not
require states to prove that checkpoints were the most effective means of
decreasing drunk driving.130 The court need only conclude, after performing the
balancing test, that checkpoints are at least "reasonably effective" in advancing
that interest.'
The court noted that neither it nor the United States Supreme Court had
specifically addressed the issue of whether drug interdiction was a sufficient
purpose to support a roadblock operation.' Similarly, no courts had upheld the
constitutionality of roadblocks established to intercept drug trafficking, although

121. Id. at 571.
122. Id.

123. Id.
124. 443 U.S. 47,50-51(1979). The Supreme Court used the Brown balancing test
to analyze the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints in Sitz.
125. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 571 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51
(1979)).
126. Id. (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 51).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. Relying on Galberth, the court framed this question in terms of whether
"the checkpoint addresses problems predictably associated with persons who are stopped
at the roadblock." Id. See Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990, 999 (D.C. 1991).
130. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 571.
131. Id. at 572.
132. Id.
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several courts had upheld "dual-purpose" checkpoints.' The court addressed
the Galberth court's finding that drug interdiction, unlike sobriety and
immigration control, was not considered a sufficient public interest because it
failed to "promote a governmental interest separate from that of general law
enforcement."' 34 While conceding the direct relation between sobriety
checkpoints and highway safety, the court rejected the notion that efforts to stem
the flow of illegal immigration were fundamentally different from efforts to
prevent drug trafficking.'35
Relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sitz, the court emphasized
that the state is not required to produce statistical evidence of its arrest ratios at
the checkpoint in order to demonstrate its effectiveness.' 36 Instead, the state
need only show that the roadblock in question is "substantially similar to prior
successful checkpoints."' 37 The court found that both roadblocks were modeled
after successful drug enforcement checkpoints in other counties.' The court's
conclusion that these drug enforcement checkpoints were reasonably effective
was bolstered by evidence which showed they were designed to "increase the
likelihood of discovering drug trafficking predictably
associated with persons
139
stopped at this type of focused roadblock.'
Turning to the final prong of the Brown balancing test, the court examined
both objectively and subjectively the degree to which the checkpoint intruded
upon the individual motorist. The court found the degree of objective intrusion
was minimal based on the limited questioning by the officers, as well as the fact
that motorists were detained, on average, only two minutes. 4 Furthermore,
because the checkpoints were based on plans which circumscribed the officer's
discretion and were designed to eliminate any fears or safety concerns motorists
might experience, the subjective intrusion also was minimal. 4' Based on its
conclusion that the checkpoints were reasonably effective in advancing the
state's interest in combating drug trafficking, the court held that the checkpoints

133. Id.

134. Id.
135. Id. The court stated, "[t]he flow of illegal drugs presents a law enforcement
problem easily as important as that posed by the passage of illegal aliens into this
country." Id.
136. Id.
137. Damask,936 S.W.2d at 573.
138. Id. at 573. The court noted that the checkpoints at issue were modeled after
a Phelps County checkpoint program, which was responsible for the seizure of more than
thirty "loads" of contraband. Id.
139. Id. For example, the Franklin County checkpoint was set up along a road
"known as a popular route for the transport of narcotics." Id. Furthermore, the
remoteness of the exit increased the likelihood that only local residents or those
attempting to avoid the roadblock would exit at that point. Id.
140. Id. at 574.
141. Id.
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did not violate either the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
or Article 1, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution.142
B. DissentingOpinion
Judge White, writing in dissent, concurred with the majority view that drug
trafficking is an important national problem. 43 He also conceded that under
certain conditions, the use of roadblocks to prevent drug trafficking could be
constitutionally permissible.1" His primary concern was the discretion given
to the officers. 4 ' He felt the checkpoints at issue resembled the roving traffic
stops struck down in Prousemore than the "well-planned, well-controlled,
non146
threatening checkpoints upheld in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte."'
Although Judge White recognized that the Sitz court had arguably
transferred the authority for defining the reasonableness of checkpoint
operations from the courts to "politically accountable officials," he still felt the
majority should perform an independent inquiry into whether the checkpoint was
reasonable. 147 In doing so, he distinguished between the "articulated and
accountable decision-making process" envisioned by the Sitz Court and the
evidence presented by the state.148 For example, "two low level officers" made
the decision to conduct a checkpoint operation, and law enforcement
officials
149
did not formalize the plan until after the arrests occurred.
Judge White also was concerned with the level of intrusion experienced by
the motorists. 5 ' Relying on Prouse,he noted that under ideal conditions, "the
motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, [and] he can see visible
signs of the officer's authority .... ,,. In contrast, he characterized the
checkpoint operations at issue as occurring late at night, and situated in a poorly
lighted and completely isolated area.' The presence of armed officers wearing

142. Id. at 575.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 576.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. In other words, the same officers who operated the checkpoint also
organized the operation and developed the plan for the other officers' conduct, without
the input or approval of any higher-ranking officials. Id. at 577-78. Judge White felt this
clearly violated the Supreme Court's admonition against the "'unfettered discretion of
officers in the field."' Id. at 577 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
150. Id. at 577.
151. Damask,936 S.W.2d at 577.
152. Id. In reference to the subjective prong used to measure the level of intrusion,

Judge White stated, "it is difficult to envision a scenario more likely to engender fright
or confusion in an innocent highway traveler than the Franklin County checkpoint." Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 14
MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 63

fatigues and shining flashlights into the faces of motorists also was likely to
frighten motorists. 153 Finally, it was unclear whether the motorists could see
other motorists being pulled over, or whether marked cars were visible to the
motorists.'54 Because the state could not show either that the roadblock was
effective, or that the field officers followed explicit, neutral guidelines, Judge
White concluded that the officers operated the checkpoints in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.'
V. COMMENT
The Missouri Supreme Court's decision to sanction the use of roadblocks
conducted solely to combat drug trafficking is cause for concern, especially in
light of the procedures utilized by law enforcement authorities in operating the
checkpoint operations. While past state court and U.S. Supreme Court decisions
do not rule out the constitutionality of drug enforcement checkpoints under
certain limited circumstances, the court, in applying the Brown balancing test,
ignored factors necessary to constitutionally validate the use of roadblocks.
A. State Interest
While no one disputes the magnitude of drug trafficking problems in this
country, by enlisting the use of roadblocks in the continuing war on drugs, the
court further expanded the parameters of accepted purposes to include general
crime control. 6 The U.S. Supreme Court has never approved a roadblock for
purely criminal law enforcement purposes.5 7 Furthermore, dictum in Prouse
suggests that the Fourth Amendment always requires individualized suspicion
for those seizures which have a general law enforcement purpose. Although
Prouse can be distinguished on the grounds that it dealt with roving patrols
rather than roadblocks,' the Court has, to this point, allowed suspicionless stops
only when the governmental interests are "unique,"'5 9 such as for safety and
regulatory purposes."6 Although the Court has carved an exception to the safety

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 578.
156. The dissent in Everson wrote, "in this case, the roadblock was implemented
to discover evidence of drugs. Next time, under the rationale of the majority, the
roadblock may be designed to discover evidence of stolen property, illegal guns,
transportation of underage females for purposes ofprostitution, or violations of any other
criminal law." State v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695, 704-05 (N.D. 1991).
157. Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990, 997 (D.C. 1991).
158. See Dilenge, supranote 83 at 574.
159. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-55 (1990).
160. See Jonathan A. Block, Please Stop: The Law Court's Recent Roadblock
Decisions,44 ME.L. REv.461,462-64 (1992). While sobriety checkpoints may indirectly
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/14
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and regulatory requirements by upholding the immigration checkpoints in
Martinez-Fuerte,
in that case a higher degree of necessity was required by the
61
state.1
The Missouri Supreme Court's failure to explain why preventing drug
trafficking is an important governmental interest, as distinguished from other
general interest in crime control, invites law enforcement officials to establish
roadblocks for practically any reason related to crime control. 62 The concem
that officers will utilize roadblocks as a means of evading the Fourth
Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion helps explain why some
courts have
struck down roadblocks where the primary purpose is general crime
63
control.
B. The Issue of Discretion
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and Missouri courts have sought to prevent
the "standardless and unconstrained exercise of discretion" by law enforcement
officials that is of fundamental concern when analyzing the constitutionality of
a roadblock!" 4 Some courts ignore the risk that inherent biases and prejudices
will influence the field officer when searching for drug traffickers, as opposed
to drunk drivers, because the officer relies on an entirely different set of indicia
when making this determination. 165 To minimize the risk of unbridled
discretion, the Supreme Court always has required the state to adopt plans which
carefully circumscribe the conduct of the officers when stopping motorists on
public highways."
The Damask majority cited evidence to support its conclusion that the
officers' discretion was properly limited. However, this evidence falls short of
what the U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally required in this area. In Martinez-

result in arrest, even the Missouri Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[o]ne can argue
persuasively that sobriety checkpoints relate directly to highway safety." State v.
Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 572 (Mo. 1996).
161. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). The Court stated that roadblocks
were "necessary" because the influx of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively
"using any other law enforcement mechanism." Id.
162. See Galbreath,590 A.2d at 997.
163. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding
the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints); U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (upholding the constitutionality of permanent immigration checkpoints).
164. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
165. See Braeske, supranote 92, at 461-62. The author points out that "[w]hile an
investigation can easily be confined to the indicia of alcohol intoxication, the drug
checkpoint opens up the scope of the operation to the discretion of the individual officer.
This discretion invites the individual officer to investigate those who 'look like' drug

users or traffickers." Braeske, supra note 92, at 461.
166. See Braeske, supra note 92, at 467.
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Fuerte,for example, high ranking officials determined the location and timing
of the checkpoints based on concerns of safety and effectiveness, and written
guidelines circumscribed the types of questions field officers could ask. 67 In
Sitz, the Court noted that an advisory committee was formed by the director of
the state police department to develop written guidelines. 61 Missouri courts
similarly have placed great importance on the amount of discretion placed in the
officers at the checkpoint. 69 In Canton, the court struck down a roadblock in
part because of the extensive level of discretion low-level employees were given,
as well as the lack of written procedures in operating the checkpoint.' 70
The evidence in Damask indicates that in the case of the Texas County
checkpoint, the same deputy who formulated the guidelines was in charge of the
checkpoint operation, which certainly raises questions about the neutrality of the
plan.' Furthermore, in the Franklin County operation, the sheriffs department
did not reduce the guidelines to written form until after the completion of the
operation.'
Politically accountable officials did not participate in the
formulation of the plan in either checkpoint operation, nor were they involved
in choosing the location of the site." Taken as a whole, the evidence indicates
a substantial departure from the level of discretion allowed in prior roadblock
jurisprudence. The Missouri Supreme Court overlooked the lack of discretion
in an area of the law where courts have previously required individualized
suspicion.
C. The Issue ofIntrusion
Under the Brown balancing test, courts also must examine the level of
intrusion from an objective and subjective perspective. 4 As with the issue of
discretion, when the object of the roadblock is to detect drug traffickers, the risk
of objective intrusion is greater than with other types of roadblocks. 7 In

167. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976).
168. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
169. See, e.g., State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 632-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). The
court felt there was a low level of discretion because of its findings that the plan was
based on specific data concerning alcohol related accidents in the area, the checkpoint
was established by written order of a command officer and supervised by high ranking
officials, and field officers were fully instructed. Id.
170. See State v. Canton, 775 S.W.2d 352, 353-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
171. See State v. Bishop, Nos. 20296, 20387, 20389, 20385 1996 WL 97417, at
*7(Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 27), rehg deniedsub nom. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565 (Mo.
1996).
172. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 574 n.36 (Mo. 1996). The majority,
apparently untroubled by this evidence, relegated its analysis to a footnote.
173. Id. at 576 (White, J., dissenting).
174. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,452 (1990).
175. See Braeske, supra note 92 at 464 ("Where the goal of a checkpoint is the
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analyzing multi-purpose roadblocks, many courts have recognized the possibility
that the roadblock will be used as a pretext to look for "plain view" evidence of
more serious crimes.176 Similarly, even when the sole purpose of the roadblock
is to detect drug traffickers, there is always the danger that police will
impermissibly
expand the seizure into a search without any individualized
suspicion.177
The Damask majority was willing to tolerate a high level of subjective
intrusion in both roadblocks. In contrast to the trial courts and appellate courts
of both the Southern and Eastern Districts, the majority determined that the
subjective intrusion generated by the roadblocks was minimal. 8 For example,
the court failed to address police efforts to disguise the existence and location
of the roadblock in order to surprise drug traffickers, even though past decisions
had listed surprise as an essential element in determining the level of subjective
intrusion.179 The majority also found that the checkpoint operation provided
enough notice to the motorists based on the "large illuminated" signs along the
main highway.' However, the majority ignored the conditions found at the
actual site of the checkpoint, which, according to the appellate court, had few
visible signs of authority.' Many of the visible manifestations of authority at
which the U.S. Supreme Court looked to determine subjective intrusion, such as

the outcome of the checkpoint will certainly be thorough
interdiction of drug traffic ....
searches of selected automobiles. However, an alcohol checkpoint need only conduct
conversations and field tests of individual drivers.").
176. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1982); See also U.S. v. MoralesZamores, 974 F.2d 149, 152 (10th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306, 1311
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
177. For example, the Missouri Court ofAppeals, in examining the objective level
of intrusion in the Texas County checkpoint operation, pointed to testimony by the
ranking deputy, who remarked that questions asked of the motorists "depended on your
suspicions you developed while talking to the people." State v. Bishop, Nos. 20296,
20387, 20389, 20385 1996 WL 97417, at *6 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 27), reh'gdenied sub
nom. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1996).
178. For the Missouri trial court analysis of this issue see State v. Damask, No.
ED68793 1996 WL 45063, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 6), reh'gdenied, 936 S.W.2d 565
(Mo. 1996), and Bishop, 1996 WL 97417, at *6.
179. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 460-63 (1990).
180. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 575 (Mo. 1996). While testimony
conflicted surrounding the level of subjective intrusion, the dissent pointed out that in a
prior checkpoint case, the Missouri Supreme Court held that "[o]n review, the appellate
court considers the facts and the reasonable inferences of those facts in the light most
favorable to the trial court's ruling." Id. (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 877 S.W.2d 106,
110 (Mo. 1994)).
181. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 576.
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flashing lights, flares, and uniformed police officers,' were missing from these
checkpoints.'
D. The Future ofRoadblock Operationsin Missouri
The court only briefly examined the final prong of the Brown balancing
test, which scrutinizes the effectiveness of the roadblock operation.'4 The
court's analysis, which requires only that the checkpoint be "reasonably
effective" in advancing the government's interest,'85 is consistent with the
deference given by the Supreme Court in Sitz to "politically accountable"
officials. 6 In other words, courts are not required to consider less intrusive
methods, nor must any showing be made that the checkpoint operation was more
successful than stops based upon probable cause." Prior to Sitz, when weighing
the state interest in a particular intrusion, the Court had required that the state
show a high level of effectiveness to justify the intrusion.'
And while the
Court in Martinez-Fuerte partially rejected the requirement that the state
undertake a least restrictive means analysis, it did, in fact, examine other
methods before concluding that individualized suspicion would be "impractical"
in that particular situation. 189 The most likely explanation for the Court's
wholesale departure from this requirement was the recognition that drunk drivers
pose an immediate threat to highway safety. 9 However insidious drug
trafficking may be, it does not trigger the same concerns for highway safety. As
a result, courts should hesitate before applying such a deferential level of
scrutiny when a checkpoint operation is used solely for criminal law
enforcement purposes.
Many commentators have criticizked this deferential approach by the
Supreme Court as an abdication of its traditional role as protector of the

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 546 (1976).
See Damask,936 S.W.2d at 576-77 (White, J. dissenting).
See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990).
Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 573.
Id. at 572-73.
See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-55.

188. See John M. Copacino, SuspicionlessSeizuresAfter Michigan Department of

State Police v. Sitz, 31 AM. CRim. L. REv. 215, 243 (1994). For example, in Prouse,
while acknowledging the state had a "vital interest in regulating highway safety," the
Court stated that the law enforcement method must be a "sufficiently productive
mechanism to justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests which such stops
entail." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
189. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976).
190. Justice Stevens observed, "Perhaps this tampering with the scales ofjustice
can be explained by the Court's obvious concern about the slaughter on our highways and
a resultant tolerance for policies designed to alleviate the problem by 'setting an example'
of a few motorists." Sitz, 496 U.S. at 473 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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individual's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' 9' Like the Sitz Court's recital of the destruction caused by drunk
driving on the nation's highways, 92 the court in Damask appears to justify its
impairment of individual liberties, at least in part, on the necessity to effectively
combat drug trafficking, which has become a "veritable national crisis."' 93
However, because "[t]he needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension
with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises of
official power,"'194 the court's decision to defer to government officials increases
that law enforcement methods will infringe upon an individual's
the likelihood
95
rights.1

VI. CONCLUSION
The court's decision in Damaskhelps confirm the fears of those judges and
commentators who felt that Sitz would lead to the expansion of police
roadblocks in other areas, further eroding the individual's Fourth Amendment
rights. The Missouri Supreme Court's decision to carve another exception to the
requirement of individualized suspicion in search and seizure cases ignores the
fundamental differences between roadblocks operated for safety and regulatory
purposes, and those operated for general criminal law enforcement purposes.
Finally, the specific facts under which the court upheld the roadblocks at issue
indicate the court will be very deferential to law enforcement in determining
whether the checkpoint operation violates the Fourth Amendment.
SCOTT A. WHiTE

191. See, e.g., Copancino, supra note 187, at 246; Braeske, supra note 92 at 462;
Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to
Meaningful JudicialEnforcement of ConstitutionalRights, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 300
(1991); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 266,267

(1990); Thatcher, supranote 43, at 299.
192. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451. The majority referred to the "mutilation on the
Nation's roads" as well as the "increasing slaughter on our highways... [reaching] the
astounding figures only heard on the battlefield." Id. (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352
U.S. 432, 439 (1957)).
193. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 571 (quoting United States v. Montoya de
Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)).
194. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
195. See Thatcher, supra note 43, at 299.
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